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TOTAL PACKAGE PROCUREMENT CONCEPT
Since the award of the contract for the C-5A aircraft, there 
have been numerous inquiries with respect to the methodology employed 
in the request for proposal, the source selection process, and the 
contractual arrangements. These techniques have since become known 
formally as the Total Package Procurement Concept. The Air Force is 
applying the Concept in the procurement of the SRAM and other weapon 
systems; and, with Secretary McNamara's endorsement, it is being 
applied to the Navy Fast Deployment Logistic Ship Program. In view 
of this interest, the attached paper was prepared at my request by 
Robert H. Turtle, and is based on his active participation in the 
C-5A procurement.
The purpose of this paper is to explain the philosophy and 
basic tenets of the Concept and the rationale of decisions made in 
applying it to the C-5A, in order to provide, from our limited 
practical experience to date, a basis for continued analysis and 
imaginative adaptation.
The factual material is officially documented. While many of 
the conclusions and recommendations are the result of a consensus, 
this paper should not be construed as presenting an official Air 
Force position nor the position of any one of the many offices that 
participated in the development and application of the Concept. 
Comprehensive internal and external studies are underway to identify 
the lessons learned in the C-5A procurement and to apply that exper­
ience in future procurements.
The Concept came to fruition on the C-5A through the team 
effort of many individuals throughout the Air Force, and to all 
who participated in this massive undertaking, I say, "Well done!"
The constructive attitude and helpful response shown by personnel 
of all five competing contractors - Boeing, Douglas, General Electric, 
Lockheed, and Pratt & Whitney - afforded the necessary environment 
for an objective test of the Concept.
The Total Package Procurement Concept will not by itself do 
anything for either the Government or industry, but will be given 
purpose only through the ingenuity and sustained efforts of dedi­
cated and properly motivated people interested in providing for 
National Defense within the structure of a free competitive society.
ROBERT H. CHARLES
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 
(Installations & Logistics)
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I . INTRODUCTION
The recent announcement of the award of contracts for the 
acquisition of a two billion dollar weapon system program by the 
Department of Defense1/ resulted in little of the hue and cry over 
source selection techniques that had accompanied such announcements 
on programs of similar magnitude in the near past. Instead, public 
interest was focused on the system itself2/ and the novel procure­
ment technique applied to the program. This procurement technique, 
colorfully characterized as "womb to tomb" contracting, has, for 
want of a similar ingenious title, been officially termed the Total 
Package Procurement Concept (TPPC)3/ by the Air Force. The primary 
purpose of this article is to define the Concept and explain its 
purposes and effects in order to provide from certain limited 
practical experience a basis for continued analysis and further re­
finement of the TPPC.
II. THE CONCEPT DEFINED
Most simply stated, the TPPC as conceived by the Air 
Force envisions that all anticipated development, production, and 
as much support as is feasible of a system throughout its antici­
pated life is to be procured as one total package and incorporated 
into one contract containing price and performance commitments at 
the outset of the acquisition phase of a system procurement.
III. THE PURPOSE
As is often the case in this complex world, simple state­
ments of any kind are in themselves novelties. In order to perceive 
the true novelty of the Concept, it is necessary to understand the 
sophisticated weapon system acquisition process as practiced in DOD 
and codified in the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) and 
related DOD Directives, and as implemented by myriad Service and 
Command regulations. Congratulations are proffered to those who 
have been initiated into this mystic order; and the following 
capsule summary is offered to the uninitiated.
Acquisition and operation of a typical major new weapon 
system normally involves the separate negotiation of a development 
contract, a separate initial production contract, separate follow- 
on production contracts, and contracts for training, spares, 
support systems and other operational requirements. The development
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contract is usually negotiated in a competitive atmosphere, with 
emphasis on promises of technical excellence. (Rarely were such 
promises reinforced by binding performance commitments and, if so, 
even more rarely were they tied to meaningful and enforceable cost 
commitments.) Then, because of the additional time and expense that 
would be required if another contractor were chosen for the subse­
quent contracts, noncompetitive negotiation with the development 
contractor is almost inevitable if the system is to be introduced 
into the defense inventory on a timely basis and without duplicating 
much of the development effort. The Government was thus engaged in 
"iceberg procurement;" it became wedded to a program and to a parti­
cular contractor without performance and price commitments, and 
without competition, with respect to the operational units in which 
it was really interested. And this was done with little visibility 
of the underwater portion of the iceberg, including operating costs.
In this environment competition in any form whatsoever is 
nonexistent, except on the initial development contract the cost of 
which often comprises about 20 per cent of the total cost of contracts 
let to acquire and support a major weapon system. Clearly, the 
competition for the initial development contract is intense, enhanced 
as it is by all that promises to flow to the victor in the ensuing 
years of production and operation of the system. Often this intense 
competition, itself, results directly in the generation of misleading 
cost, performance and schedule estimates which are provided to the 
DOD as back-up for the decision to embark upon Operational Systems 
Developments4/ programs.
Thus, the history of defense procurement is replete with 
cost overruns and less-than-promised performance which were, at 
least in part, the results of intentional "buy-in" bidding (where 
costs estimates are understated and performance and schedule esti­
mates overstated) on the initial contract. And this has been the 
case even in situations where there has been no substantial increase 
in the then state of the art.
The Government itself must bear much of the blame for the 
results of "iceberg procurement." By requiring only an estimate of 
performance and cost, the Government forced competitors for new 
business to overstate performance and to understate cost. Who is 
not going to try to "buy in" when he knows that his competitor can 
do so without substantial penalty; and assumes that he will?
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Another recurring theme has been the relatively uniform 
rate of profit earned despite extremes in technical performance 
and resources management by defense contractors. This is a product 
of Cost-Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contracting and of Firm Fixed Price 
(FFP) or Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) contracts5/ negotiated in a 
noncompetitive atmosphere after development. In short, the princi­
pal villains of the piece have been lack of competition and lack 
of contractual arrangements which create a climate in which the 
efficient are rewarded and the inefficient are not. Massive correc­
tive efforts during the last five years have failed to exorcise 
these demons. Price competition in the Air Force, the major pur­
chaser of complex weapon systems, increased from 14.9% in Fiscal 
Year 1961 to only 25.1% in Fiscal Year 1965. And while CPFF con­
tracts were reduced during this period from 50.6% to 10.4%, the 
target prices for 74.9% of the work in Fiscal Year 1965 were set in 
a noncompetitive environment. Targets so established simply in­
corporate, in many cases, the then existing efficiencies -- and 
inefficiencies -- of the contractor and the lack of attention given 
to production methods during the development phase. In fact, under 
the general approach to price negotiation on production contracts 
of establishing a target profit percentage to be applied to the 
Target Cost, the contractor has a negative incentive to design and 
manage during the development phase for the lowest production and 
operating costs.6/
Five principal benefits are anticipated under a concept 
which permits contracts to be awarded competitively under conditions 
where performance is related to price on substantially all of a 
given program:
1. It requires a tightening of design and configuration 
discipline, both in the specifications on which the competitors sub­
mit proposals and in the work under contract. On its part, the 
Government must be more specific in telling industry what is wanted. 
Thus, the system will be better defined before substantial resources 
are allocated to it.
2. It inhibits the unrealistic "salesmanship," or "buy- 
in" bidding, including overestimates of performance as well as 
underestimates of cost, which is encouraged when commitments are 
required on only a small part of the program, and which in the past 
has led to performance disappointments, budget disruptions, funding 
reallocations, and program stretchouts or cancellations.
3. Being committed to cost and performance figures for 
production units before detail design begins, the contractor has a 
strong motive to design initially for economical production, and
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for the reliability and simplicity of maintenance of operational 
hardware to which he is committed; all of which are strongly in­
fluenced by actions taken during the detail design period, and for 
which there is little inducement in the absence of a production 
commitment. This should, among other things, minimize production 
redesign, reduce the need for subsequent value engineering redesign, 
and anticipate and capitalize on new cost reducing machine tool and 
other fabrication techniques. It should produce not only lower costs 
on the first production units, but, in turn, a lower take-off point 
on the production learning curve, thus benefiting every unit in the 
production run. And inasmuch as ground equipment, which can repre­
sent a large portion of a system, is included in the price of the 
total package, the contractor has a positive inducement not only to 
design and build such equipment economically, but to design the 
system itself so as to require less, or at least less expensive, 
ground equipment.
4. For the same reason, the contractor is motivated to 
obtain supplies and services from the most efficient source, whether 
in-house or by outside contract. If the prime contractor has 
committed himself to deliver an article with a specified performance 
for a certain price -- rather than at whatever the cost may turn out
to be -- and especially if that price has been set competitively,
you can be sure that, with respect to the approximately 50% of the
work which he obtains from others, he will use the most effective
ways to obtain the necessary quality at the lowest price -- and how 
can he do this other than by bringing into play those very forces 
which compel efficiency, namely competition and incentives?
5. Competition is increased at the beginning, thereby 
decreasing the need for subsequent competitive reprocurement of 
components, with all the drawbacks that this entails. When a compo­
nent has been originally built by or under the direction of a prime 
contractor and is then put out for competitive bidding and is built 
by another company, a risk concerning the integrity of the system as 
a whole is created, complete interchangeability of the component is 
threatened, and a difficult-enough logistics problem is further 
complicated by a new part and part number.
6. When commitments are established in competition, the 
winner is forced to be efficient. There is a natural desire to 
excel. Competition transforms this desire into necessity. And the 
resulting efficiency benefits not only the buyer, but the seller.
He is then in a better position to compete for the next round of 
business, and in other markets.
4
7. It permits the Department to make a choice between 
competing contractors based, not on mere estimates, but on binding 
commitments concerning the performance and price of what is really 
required -- operational equipment.
Inasmuch as application of the TPPC to a program is not 
feasible until the technological building blocks are in hand and 
the operational hardware requirement, both qualitative and quanti­
tative, can be specified with reasonable precision and with reason­
able expectation that it can be achieved, the advent of this 
procurement technique has had to await the growth of complementary 
planning and scientific management techniques. Presently, Weapon 
Systems Analysis and Director of Defense Research and Engineering 
(DDR&E) reviews are directed toward insuring that these conditions 
are met prior to the initiation of Operational Systems Development. 
Concept Formulation and Contract Definition required by DDR&E as a 
prerequisite to full-scale development7/ provides the building 
blocks for the TPPC. Thus, today, given Systems Analysis to 
establish our hardware requirements and Concept Formulation and 
Contract Definition to provide a reasonable expectation that they 
can be achieved, we no longer need to separate development from 
production for contractual purposes. We can lump the two together. 
In fact, we can go further and add much of the support, including 
spares, training and support systems and contractor technical 
services.
IV. EFFECT ON STANDARD PROCUREMENT PRACTICES.
Application of the Concept has an impact on all phases 
of standard Government procurement practices beginning with the 
Request for Proposals (RFP) issued for Contract Definition (CD) 
and including the selection of CD contractors, the Work Statement 
of the CD contract, the proposals submitted for the development and 
production contract, the selection of the winning competitor, the 
type of contract awarded, and the management of the program.
A. Precontract.
It is impractical and probably unnecessary to treat 
the changes in all of these steps in detail in an article of this 
kind. It should be realized, however, that planning for a Total 
Package buy must begin prior to and be incorporated into the initial 
RFP for CD. In order to obtain maximum benefit from the Concept,
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competition must be maintained during the entire period in which 
the contractor prepares his cost and technical proposals for a Total 
Package contract, and this requires efforts of at least two contrac­
tors during this period and the ensuing selection period. Moreover, 
preparation for a Total Package proposal will usually require the 
application of greater resources and time than that required for 
preparation of a "development only" proposal.
Preparation of an RFP for the CD phase of a Total 
Package procurement may also require the allocation of greater DOD 
resources, since the desired response will cover production and 
support as well as development. In order to assure the maximum 
degree of comparability between competitive proposals, the RFP 
package should contain a model of the Total Package contract. While 
the terms of this proposed contract can be revised during and after 
CD, it is always helpful in source selection to be able to compare 
the contractors' responses in a common frame of reference.
Application of the Concept precludes the selection of 
a CD contractor who lacks production capability. Such a contractor 
would not normally participate in CD even if a Total Package procure­
ment were not intended; but production capability is a mandatory 
requirement for the accomplishment of a Total Package CD as will 
become evident from the Work Statement of a Total Package CD con­
tract. Whereas the Work Statement of a CD contract preceding a 
development contract only requires the preparation of firm prices 
or targets on the development phase of the contract with estimates 
for production and operational support, the Work Statement of a 
Total Package CD contract requires the preparation of firm prices 
or targets on development, production, operational support, and may 
require guarantees of operating costs as well.
In addition to the additional data that must be sub­
mitted to the Government in support of a Total Package proposal, the 
contractor must engage in in-depth analysis and projection of cost 
figures, and in all probability, initiate some preliminary design 
efforts in order to provide himself with the required degree of 
confidence inherent in a Total Package commitment. Inasmuch as this 
commitment extends to operational performance and schedule as well, 
the contractor must likewise have a high degree of confidence in his 
preliminary plans with a consequent shift of a substantial portion 
of his workload to the CD period. The advantages and disadvantages 
of this early emphasis will be considered later in this article.
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In short, the proposal submitted during CD must, 
in order to be responsive, contain firm commitments to operational 
performance, to development, production, and support costs, and to 
the operational hardware delivery schedule.
B. Source Selection.
A principal purpose of the TPPC is to engender the 
highest degree of competition on as much of a program as is possible. 
The degree of competition achieved is a function of the extent, 
form and intensity of the competition. These factors are, in turn, 
a direct result of the stated basis of source selection and award8/.
As discussed earlier the extent of competition in an 
Operational System Development Program seldom exceeds 20% of the 
total program eventually put on contract. The most prevalent forms 
of competition in Government procurement practice are price compe­
tition and technical competition.
Price competition and technical competition in the 
framework of prior Government procurements have been inverse 
variables. That is, where technical competition is primary, prices 
both on development and production could be expected to rise. Con­
versely, where the acquisition cost was the primary consideration, 
technology in terms of operational performance could be expected to 
suffer.
The principle of price competition was adhered to in 
formally advertised procurements where the Government could state 
with detailed specificity the exact item that it wished to procure 
after experience had shown that an optimum cost/performance mix 
could be obtained at that performance level. Where, because of 
lack of prior acquisition and operating experience, the Government 
could not specify with the requisite detail the exact nature of the 
hardware it wished to acquire, prime emphasis was placed on techni­
cal excellence and cost remained to be negotiated with the winning 
competitor.
The Concept allows a unique opportunity to expand the 
extent, form and intensity of the competition for selection as the 
program contractor. This is accomplished by basing the source 
selection on the cost effectiveness of the anticipated operational 
quantity in an operational environment over a period of time equal
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to the anticipated first-line utilization of the system. This 
approach has previously been utilized by DOD to select systems for 
acquisition from the myriad systems proposed by the Services, and 
is a concise summary of the Government's ultimate goal in weapon 
systems evolution.
It is only logical then that this method for compari­
son of items with dissimilar cost and performance attributes be used 
to select a source for the chosen system in order to optimize the 
most performance/least cost equation. The Cost side of a cost 
effectiveness formula considers development, production, support, 
maintenance, construction, and operating costs of an operational 
system over a period of useful life. The Productivity side of the 
formula considers the useful output of that number of systems over 
an equal period of time. This type of evaluation is never easy, but 
the detailed planning prior to initiation of CD and the firm commit­
ments to development, production, and support costs, as well as 
operational performance and delivery schedule obtained from the con­
tractor's Total Package proposal make it possible.
Both price and technical competition are engendered on 
the development, production, and support of the system since the all- 
inclusive Contract Price will comprise a substantial part of the cost 
side of the formula, while the concurrent technological considera­
tions as they pertain to operational capability will be reflected in 
the productivity figures and in maintenance, investment and operating 
cost figures.
Total Package contracting does not require awards to 
be made to the low bidder. It does require performance and price 
commitments by competitors, and the award can then be made after 
considering all factors in an integrated, meaningful manner. In 
this connection, it should be borne in mind that in most techno­
logically advanced weapon systems, performance standing by itself 
is more important than price standing by itself, but that the two 
factors should and usually can be related.
C. Contract.
Assuming that the competitive atmosphere engendered in 
a Total Package CD results in desirable commitments to Cost, Per­
formance and Schedule, a final contractual document embodying all 
these commitments must be structured. In order to facilitate the
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of
incorporation of these commitments into a definitive document, 
it is desirable to have the proposed contract executed by each 
competitor in definitive form prior to the announcement of the 
selected source. In order to assure the attainment of the pro­
posed Cost, Performance and Schedule commitments made by the con­
tractor in CD, the contract should establish these characteristics 
as firm obligations rather than as goals. Thus, a cost-type contract 
would be inappropriate in a Total Package procurement.
Similarly, a Work Statement and specifications estab­
lishing certain performance and schedule levels as goals, rather 
than firm requirements, would likewise fail to retain the advan­
tages of a competitive CD. Whether the contract should be FFP or 
FPI (and if FPI, the ceiling and sharing arrangement) should be 
determined on a case-by-case basis after consideration of the 
degree of risk inherent in the program and with the realization 
that the contractor is being asked to make production and operating 
cost as well as performance commitments prior to full-scale develop­
ment of the system.
This uncertainty may result in all competitors 
allowing large reserves for purposes of meeting contingencies under 
an FFP contract. Thus, in most cases a FPI contract is best suited 
to Total Package procurements. The contract will cover the develop­
ment, test and production of the operational hardware required, 
including support and training equipment, together with prices or 
pricing formulae for spares and support or training services re­
quired of the contractor in the operational phase.
Conceivably, each of these categories could be priced 
or targeted separately, but a single price in the case of an FFP, 
or target price and ceiling in the case of an FPI contract, is 
preferable, inasmuch as it allows a contractor the greatest lati­
tude in meeting the operational requirement, guards against trade­
offs that may be inimical to the Government's best interest and is 
administratively easier than computation of separate incentive fees 
and ceilings. In addition to progress payments, presumably billing 
prices would be used on long-term contracts to allow for a recoup­
ment of unrecovered costs as certain work is performed or hardware 
is delivered.
1. Work Statement. Development, test, production, 
support and training equipment and services to cover the operational 
hardware throughout its planned useful life may be stated as a firm contract requirement, or may be stated in part as priced options.
Use of an option technique is especially desirable where quantita­
tive requirements may be revised during the course of a program.
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Obtaining a target price proposal for option increments does not do 
violence to the theory of Total Package procurement, since the con­
tractor, by virtue of his commitment contingent only upon the Govern­
ment's decision, must prepare his proposal and plan for the develop­
ment and production of the hardware as if the requirement were firm.
Utilization of several alternate option arrange­
ments in the RFP provides the Government with flexibility in struc­
turing the definitive Total Package contract work statement. De­
sirable options may be carried over into the Definitive Contract to 
allow the Government flexibility even after award of a Total Package 
contract. It should be realized, however, that requesting proposals 
on alternate bases may raise the cost of CD. Further, incorporating 
options in the work statement of the Definitive Contract may result 
in paying a higher price for the combined contract requirement and 
option increments than could be obtained by including the option in­
crements in the original contract requirement. This can be minimized 
by including enough production units in the contract requirement so 
that the contractor will have the facilities with which to produce 
the option increments on hand and by establishing the number of units 
in each increment and the lead time for exercise of the option so as 
to provide for economical materials purchasing and handling and 
continuous production.
Where it appears reasonable to expect that the 
total number of production units ultimately required will equal or 
exceed the contract requirement and priced option increments, con­
sideration should be given to establishing the entire combined amount 
as the contract requirement. In that case, the savings to the Govern­
ment, if any, to be earned by placing all production units on con­
tract must be weighed against the possibility of termination costs 
should the Government's quantitative requirement be decreased. In 
this connection, the limitation of the Government's obligation 
clause9/ which provides a ceiling on total cost to the Government 
should the program be terminated provides a tool for ready comparisons.
2. Special Provisions. Once having established the 
type of contract, i.e., FFP or FPI, and the Contract Requirements, 
i.e., development, production quantities, including training and 
support equipment and services, spares and contract options on the 
above, it remains to establish certain contractual procedures to (1) 
maintain the validity of the established target prices during the 
course of the program (2) provide reasonable protection for the con­
tractor against cost increases that are beyond his control, and (3) 
encourage the contractor to exceed, where economically possible, the 
price, performance and schedule commitments contained in the Total 
Package contract.
To these ends , Total Package procurement has 
engendered or utilized certain new contract clauses designed to
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accomplish the above requirements. While many of these clauses 
have potential application beyond the TPPC, they are especially 
useful in, and in fact were created to deal with, problems arising 
out of such procurements.
a. Maintaining commitments. The problem of main­
taining throughout the life of the program the price, performance 
and schedule commitments so carefully established in competition 
is first in order of time, and possibly importance.
The weakest points in the chain leading from 
competitively established initial contract commitments to final con­
tract realizations are those situations in which the contract is re­
opened for negotiation during the course of the program and there­
fore on a sole source basis. These situations, because of the 
changing nature of defense requirements, are not rare or unusual 
occurrences and must be provided for under the contract. Usually 
they are a consequence of a Government directed or approved varia­
tion from the contract work statement in the areas of (1) drawings, 
designs, or specifications (2) delivery schedules, or (3) quanti­
ties. Pursuant to the "Changes" and "Termination for Convenience" 
clauses of the contract, equitable adjustments to the contract must 
be negotiated for such deviations.
By far the most frequent opportunity for 
negotiation occurs in the area of changes to the drawings, designs, 
or specifications. These changes cannot be avoided entirely since 
often they incorporate some technical advance or result from a 
change in requirements arising from a change in defense strategy. 
There is no doubt, however, that historically many specification 
changes have been unnecessary and have increased program costs by a 
greater margin than the benefits derived therefrom.
The problem has been to devise techniques that 
would discourage both Contractor and Government program managers 
from making unwarranted changes in the system being acquired, while 
not discouraging valid technical improvements. Government represen­
tatives can be directed not to make unnecessary changes, but the 
Contractor cannot be prohibited from initiating them and attempting 
to gain Government approval. By far the most effective technique 
for dealing with this problem is to reduce the problem itself. This 
can be done by expressing what the Government wants, not in terms of 
detail or parts specifications, but in terms of operational per­
formance. In such case, there is no need to make a change in the 
contract itself if a drawing or a detail specification is changed.
i. Price Commitments. While the Department 
has experimented with various changes in pricing arrangements, the
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general practice has been to negotiate the same profit percentage 
on changes as was negotiated on the basic contract. In order to 
provide the Contractor with a reduced incentive to initiate changes, 
a new pricing structure has been proposed. This initial attempt at 
limiting changes has taken the form of eliminating the contractor's 
target profit on changes over a certain base percentage amount pur­
suant to a contractually established specification change pricing 
clause.
Acceleration and deceleration in rate of 
hardware delivery and related services is not unusual in Defense 
programs. These variations, dictated by changes in the world situa­
tion, are often beyond the predictive capability of the planners.
The use of a single long-term contract rather than annual negotia­
tion increases the potential for variations from the contract de­
livery schedule. This potential may be decreased by initially estab­
lishing a reasonable and economical delivery schedule.
Initially, delivery rate is a function of 
the resources and facilities allocated to production. Thus, the 
contractor initially tools and arranges facilities for a certain 
delivery rate dictated by the Government after an assessment of the 
quantities and time period in which the hardware must be introduced 
into the Defense inventory. Historically, and in the absence of 
changed requirements, the rate so established has been constant 
throughout the majority of the contract period with deviations 
occurring only in the build-up and tapering off time phases. This 
constant rate approach is usually not the most efficient over the 
entire contract period, since learning benefits derived during a 
production program often allow for an increase in rate at little or 
no increase in facilities and tooling, and thus, a consequent de­
crease in fixed costs per production unit.
This loss of economy becomes a problem of 
even greater magnitude as the contract period is expanded from 
annual production increments to a Total Package buy. It is there­
fore imperative that in a Total Package buy serious consideration 
and analysis be devoted to the initial establishment of a delivery 
schedule which, within the limitations of military necessity, allows 
for most economical production.
Moreover, past experiences indicate that 
despite the aforementioned potential for greater economy by in­
creases in delivery rates as the production program progresses, 
schedule changes, whether compressions or stretchouts, have resulted 
in the negotiation of price increases. On the assumption that a
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substantial portion of such increases can be related to negotia­
tions in a sole source environment, it is essential that such 
negotiations be eliminated to the greatest extent possible. There­
fore, a Total Package contract should, if possible, initially 
establish definite alternate target prices for variations from the 
initial delivery schedule. In such a case the Department will 
retain both the flexibility necessary to protect the Nation's mili­
tary posture and the ability to exercise this flexibility without 
losing the advantages of target prices established in competition. 
Further, the ability to establish in advance the additional costs 
or savings resulting from a contemplated change in delivery schedule 
is an important tool in deciding whether a change should be made.
In a contract which calls for development, 
production, and services in finite amounts over a substantial 
period of time, attention must be given to the possibility of a 
change in quantitative requirements resulting in a termination of 
the program short of delivery of the original contract quantities. 
Generally, such terminations for the convenience of the Government 
are accomplished under a specific contract clause which allows for 
an agreement between the contractor and the contracting officer on 
the amount to be paid the contractor by reason of a total or partial 
termination. This amount may include a reasonable profit on work 
already accomplished. The major limitation on this amount is that 
it may not exceed the contract price (the ceiling price in incentive 
contracts) less any sums already paid and less the contract price 
(ceiling price) of any work remaining on the contract.
In a Total Package situation, given the 
length of the contract and the myriad tasks to be accomplished 
thereunder, application of this principle would leave an enormous 
area for negotiation, especially if termination occurred in the 
early years of a program. In order to limit this enlarged area of 
negotiation, a limitation, similar to the contract (ceiling) price 
limitation imposed on annual contracts, should be established at 
the outset of the program for each year of the anticipated program. 
Such a limitation of the Government's obligation would be based on 
the anticipated annual production costs, plus advanced buy require­
ments for long lead time items, plus an amount for contingent 
termination liability should the program be terminated during a 
particular program year.
ii. Performance Commitments. In the past, 
the Department has relied on an Inspection Clause to assure that
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items delivered and accepted met the contract requirements. Pur­
suant to this clause, acceptance becomes conclusive on the matter 
of meeting contract requirements except as regards latent defects, 
fraud, or other such gross mistakes as amount to fraud. Utilization 
of this clause has engendered many problems, since it is often diffi­
cult to determine whether a sophisticated item of equipment meets 
contract requirements until it is placed in an operational environ­
ment. Recognition of this problem had led to the creation of the 
Correction of Deficiencies Clause to be found in recent Air Force 
major weapon system acquisition contracts. This clause created a 
type of warranty of useability in an attempt to assure compliance 
with certain contract requirements relating to operational perform­
ance.
Difficulties experienced with both the 
Inspection and the existing Correction of Deficiencies Clauses, even 
in situations where a complete development test program had been 
accomplished prior to establishing operational performance require­
ments for individual items of hardware, led inevitably to the conclu­
sion that such difficulties would be intensified in a program which 
establishes operational performance requirements prior to the develop­
ment effort. Realizing that commitments to operational performance 
of hardware are of little value in the absence of adequate testing 
and corrective procedures requires that attention be directed to a 
revised contractual provision allowing for such procedures.
A primary purpose of such a clause should 
be to extend, where necessary, the period of time within which 
actionable defects may be discovered so that the Department is af­
forded an opportunity to test and inspect each item of hardware in an 
operational environment. Usually this can be accomplished by adding 
a reasonable period to the date of final acceptance of an item of 
hardware to allow for operating experience.
However, in a Total Package procurement, 
some operational hardware will usually be delivered before all develop 
ment testing has been completed and, therefore, allowance must be 
made for a reasonable period of time after acceptance and after com­
pletion of development testing to allow for operational experience. 
Further, the clause should provide a definite procedure for the 
timely execution of decisions after a defect is discovered. Thus, 
discovery of a defect should trigger a timely notification of the 
defect by one party to the other, a timely request for a proposal for 
corrective actions, containing estimates of correction costs, and a 
direction by the Department of Defense that the defect be corrected 
in whole or in part, or not at all.
14
Moreover, the Department should retain 
the ability to direct, with regard to each item of hardware, either 
that the defect be fully corrected, partially corrected, or not 
corrected, and in the case of less than complete correction there 
should be an equitable reduction in Target Cost, Target Price and 
Ceiling Price. In the case of corrections to be made in whole or 
in part, the time and place of corrective action should likewise 
remain a prerogative of the Government. Decisions to correct in 
whole or in part and the amount of an equitable adjustment should 
be based upon a comparison of the portion of correction costs to 
be borne by the Government with productivity differentials over the 
anticipated useful life of the system.
iii. Schedule Commitments. The third major 
area in which the Contractor has made commitments is that of 
delivery schedules. The value and cost effectiveness of a weapon 
system are often substantially influenced by the timing of its 
introduction into the operational inventory. Extra-contractual 
program elements must be planned for and timed to coincide with the 
delivery schedule contained in the contract. Thus, time is of the 
essence in these contracts. However, establishing actual damages 
for failure of timely delivery is a difficult task because of the 
necessary flexibility of the military establishment and the limi­
tations imposed on the dissemination of information regarding 
military posture and alternatives. Consequently, the DOD has 
historically endured untimely delivery and the resulting expenses 
rather than take legal action to establish and recover damages.
Recently, a liquidated damages approach 
has been taken wherein the value of use of a system is determined 
by considering the costs of obtaining comparable performance from 
existing systems over the period of delinquent delivery. In this 
manner reasonable assessments of potential damage can be derived 
at the outset of the program and can be included in the contract 
as liquidated damages for late delivery.
b. Protection Against Unreasonable Risk. Commit­
ments to performance, price, and delivery of operational hardware 
(made prior to full-scale development of the hardware) impose a 
higher degree of risk upon the defense contractor than he has been 
required to assume in the past. In order to assure that this 
degree of risk is not so high as to be unreasonable and conse­
quently necessitate the inclusion of unreasonably high contingency 
factors in proposals, the contract should be structured so as to
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reflect that risk and to exclude, insofar as is possible, responsi­
bility for contingencies beyond the contractor's control.
i. Contract Types. Certain development 
production contingencies may be covered by the type of contract 
awarded. Thus, as previously observed, an FFP Contract is not 
usually appropriate in a Total Package procurement. Instead, an FPI 
Contract seems to have a better chance of balancing the objectives 
of firm commitments against the potential for unreasonable risk.
The balance that is struck is usually a function of the relationship 
of Target Cost to Ceiling Price and the Incentive Sharing Arrange­
ment which governs the costs to be borne by the parties within that 
area. Thus, when a contractor proposes a Target Cost, he will not 
automatically incur an out-of-pocket loss if actual costs exceed the 
Target Cost and Target Profit. To be sure, a diminution in antici­
pated profit will result, but this is a more reasonable risk to 
assume. Development and production risk is within the contractor's 
control to some extent and is increased or decreased by the conserva­
tism or optimism expressed in his cost proposal.
Many studies have been undertaken on the 
optimum relationship between risk assumed and Ceiling Price and 
Incentive Share. Suffice it to say that the Ceiling Price should be 
high enough above Target Price to allow for some consideration of 
development and production contingencies without invalidating the 
price commitments, and the Incentive Share should be high enough to 
encourage efficiency without imposing unreasonable risk.
ii. Escalation. In addition to the risks 
inherent in performing development and production work arising from 
the potential for deviations from the development and production 
work plans, there are always risks inherent in estimating the costs 
of the anticipated work required. These risks are minimized by 
annual contract negotiations, and conversely are magnified by exten­
sion of a contract over longer periods of time. Requiring price 
commitments for an entire program at the outset increases this risk 
in proportion to the length of the contract period.
Thus, consideration should be given to 
affording the contractor a reasonable degree of protection from un­
foreseeable changes in the national economy as reflected in appro­
priate Bureau of Labor Standards Indices. Further, where labor 
represents a substantial portion of prime contract and material 
costs, consideration should likewise be given to protecting the 
contractor from labor-associated cost changes that are beyond his
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control, particularly those which are within the control of the 
Government. Thus, substantial cost deviations arising from 
changes in Federal Statutes governing work conditions and fringe 
benefits should be the responsibility of the Government.
c. Motivation to Exceed Commitments. While 
competition and hard-nosed negotiation can be expected to obtain 
for the Government the most desirable cost and performance commit­
ments reasonably available at the outset of a program, the poten­
tial longevity of a Total Package contract adds emphasis to the 
need for encouraging the contractor to meet or better his commit­
ments during the course of the program.
Similarly, the length of a Total Package 
program affords the contractor more opportunity to improve upon 
his commitments, either by taking advantage of new technological 
developments occurring during the program period or by management 
action leading to greater cost efficiencies. Given these oppor­
tunities, it remains to provide suitable incentives to assure that 
they will be seized upon by the contractor.
i. Cost Incentive (including Flexible Cost 
Incentive). Total Package contracting poses a dilemma: Is there
too much risk?; and if the risk is contained, how can the contrac­
tor be motivated to produce high quality at low cost? A fixed 
incentive formula with steep cost sharing may force competitors 
to include, in their target cost bids, contingency factors which 
later prove to be unnecessary. On the other hand, a fixed incentive 
formula with a mild incentive will not adequately motivate, during 
development, economy of production design, product reliability, and 
simplicity of maintenance, and will not adequately discourage the 
performance of work in-house that could more efficiently be per­
formed by outside contract. What is needed is a contractual 
arrangement which, without exposing the winning competitor to too 
much risk, will nevertheless motivate him as if he had that risk.
In recognition of the dual desire to 
temper the risk of a life-cycle Total Package program entered into 
competitively, and simultaneously to provide a sufficiently strong 
incentive to motivate high quality at low cost, a cost incentive 
formula has been developed that provides that the contractor's 
share in cost overruns and underruns, which may start out at a 
relatively mild figure, may be adjusted voluntarily and unilaterally 
by the contractor during the performance of the contract, so that if
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he can reduce his costs, he will be able to generate higher incen­
tive profits by increasing his share in cost underruns. Such ad­
justments will, for all practical purposes, operate prospectively 
only and may be made only within clearly defined limitations.
As in the case of the usual incentive 
contract, this flexible incentive will require the establishment of 
a target cost, a target profit, a ceiling price, and an initial 
cost-sharing arrangement for deviations from the target cost, for 
example 15%. The key difference is that as the work progresses, the 
contractor will be permitted, from time to time, to change his share 
in cost overruns and underruns by electing a higher or lower "incre­
mental” share on the work then remaining to be performed. The 
various incremental shares, thus weighted to reflect the percentage 
of work performed while each incremental share is in effect, will 
be combined to produce a "composite" share which will ultimately be 
used to determine the contractor's cost reward or penalty.
The following limitations on this unila­
teral right on the part of the contractor have been used:
(1) The contractor's maximum incremental
share will be 50%.
(2) The contractor may not change his 
share before 25% of after 75% of the target cost has been incurred, 
nor more frequently than once a year.
(3) An incremental share may not be lower 
than half of the immediately preceding incremental share, and in no 
case lower than the share initially established in competition.
Thus, an initial share of 15%, a 50% 
restriction on incremental shares and a prohibition against increas­
ing the share before 25% of the work has been performed, limits the 
maximum composite cost share to 41 1/4% computed as follows:
.15 incremental Share x .25 expended = .0375
.50 incremental share x .75 unexpended = .3750
In order to encourage the contractor 
voluntarily to steepen his cost share (which would represent greater 
risk), and to do so as soon as possible, thus increasing the
.4125
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motivation desired, the formula provides an increase in the target 
profit in the amount of 15% of any increase in the contractor's 
composite share, multiplied by the amount of work remaining on the 
date of election. This automatically places a premium on in­
creasing the share as soon as possible.
For example, if the maximum incremental 
share of 50% is elected when only 25% of the work has been per­
formed, the contractor's actual profit will be greater until his 
actual cost exceeds the target cost by 11 l/4% , than if he had 
made no election. If the maximum share is elected when 50% of the 
work has been performed, this break-even point is reached when 
actual costs exceed the target by 7½%; and if such election occurs 
when 75% of the work has been performed, the break-even point is 
at 3 3/4% of the target cost. There is also a reduction in the 
target profit, similarly calculated, whenever the contractor 
elects to decrease his cost share.
To illustrate, if the contractor elects 
a 407o incremental share after 25% of the target cost has been 
expended, and subsequently elects a 20% incremental share after 
50% of the target cost has been expended, his target profit will 
first be increased by 2.109375% , and then reduced by 0.75%, for a 
net increase of 1.35975%, computed as follows:
Change in 
Target Profit
.15 incremental share x .25 expended = .0375 
.40 incremental share x .75 unexpended = .3000
composite share .3375
.3375 new composite share 
.15 previous share
.1875 increase in composite share x .15 =
.028125 x .75 remaining work = + .02109375
.15 incremental share x .25 expended = .0375
.40 incremental share x .25 expended = .1000
.20 incremental share x .50 unexpended = .1000
composite share .2375
.3375 previous composite share
.2375 new composite share
.1000 decrease in composite share x .15 =
- .015 x .50 remaining work =
Net Increase in Target Profit
- .0075 
+ .0135975
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The net effect is that the contractor is 
permitted to earn a genuinely handsome profit, both from the in­
crease in target profit and from a greater share in cost savings, 
if he is willing to go to a steeper share early in the program; but 
the opportunities for increased profit diminish as he gets further 
down the road and the risk decreases. The formula is thus deli­
berately designed to induce the contractor to try, from the begin­
ning, to get into a position to increase his profit, both by a 
higher share ratio and by a higher target profit; and he can get 
into that position only by controlling his costs as early as 
possible, while concurrently assuring himself that his technical 
performance and schedule commitments are being met.
This contractual arrangement does not 
present the possibility of excessive profit. In the extreme case, 
a maximum 507, incremental share elected after 25% of work completion 
involves a target profit of 12.953125% and a composite cost share of 
41¼%. If the actual cost is 107, under target, the incentive profit 
will be 4.125% , and the total profit will be 17.078125% of target 
cost, or 18.97577, of actual cost. But a 10% cost underrun, while 
possible if the target is set without competition, is unlikely if 
set under conditions of adequate competition. An underrun of this 
magnitude under competitive conditions would most likely mean, not 
a windfall profit, but that the contractor is in fact truly effi­
cient.
One of the objectives of the TPPC is to 
provide a greater profit spread in order to encourage efficiency, 
and where the circumstances permit it the best way to do so is to 
set the target competitively and permit the ultimate profit to be 
determined by the efficiency of the winning competitor.
Of greater concern than unusually high 
profits is the fact that the winning competitor may have set too 
difficult a target, thereby creating a situation where the proba­
bility of exceeding the target is much greater than that of an 
underrun. This risk, of course, is ameliorated by the low initial 
cost share, and the fact that the winning competitor is not re­
quired to increase that share.
In order to help the Government to de­
termine whether to use a fixed or flexible cost incentive in a Total 
Package procurement, it may, under appropriate circumstances, be 
appropriate to ask the competitors to submit alternate bids, on both 
bases.
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ii. Performance Incentives. It is antici­
pated that where the basis of award is life cycle cost effective­
ness, each bidder will submit a proposal setting forth the highest 
performance standards he is confident of attaining, since the 
Department of Defense will give consideration, in the competition, 
to the benefits to be realized from any performance standards in 
excess of the RFP requirements. The contract awarded to the 
winning competitor will incorporate the proposed standards as the 
minimum acceptable contract standards; and the contractor will be 
required to meet these standards under the Correction of Defi­
ciencies clause.
Nevertheless, the Department may desire 
to incorporate incentives for achieving performance superior to 
the standards specified in the contract. Of particular interest 
is a total incentive formula, including productivity, expressed in 
terms of costs (development, production, investment, manpower, 
training, spares, maintenance, fuel), thereby allowing the Contrac­
tor the greatest latitude in increasing productivity per dollar.
The dollar levels of such performance 
rewards should be determined on the basis of value to the Depart­
ment of any cost effectiveness increase over the anticipated total 
utilization during the period of first line use of the system.
The performance reward should be equal to an amount derived by 
applying the Contractor's overrun/underrun share to this predicted 
value. Thus, in the case of a transportation system that will 
produce 28 billion ton-miles at $.05 a ton-mile on the basis of the 
contract performance requirements, a reduction in the cost per ton- 
mile of 2% or $.001 would be worth 28 million dollars to the Depart­
ment.
Therefore, this performance increase is 
desirable if it can be obtained for a total cost to the Government 
of anything less than 28 million dollars. This 28-million-dollar 
figure must cover both the Government's share of the increased 
development and production costs and the contractor's performance 
reward. The Contractor will be motivated to attain this performance 
increase only if his share of increased costs of development and 
production is less than his performance reward. A simple equation 
can be derived by treating "less than" as "equal to." Thus, the 
Department desires the Government share of increased costs (IC) 
plus performance reward (PR) to equal value (V), while the Contrac­
tor desires the Contractor share in increased costs (IC) to equal 
performance reward (PR).
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If value (V) is 28 million dollars, and 
the Incentive Share is 85/15, the Government is willing to pay a 
total of 28 million dollars in increased costs plus performance 
reward, or
.85IC + PR = 28 M.
The Contractor is willing to provide the increased performance, if 
his performance reward (PR) is equal to his share in increased 
costs (IC), or
.15IC = PR
Substitution, to make Government and Contractor trade-offs identical 
results in PR being equal to 4.2 million, or the Contractor share in 
increased costs multiplied by the value of the increased performance.
In the case of a flexible cost incentive 
contract, the performance reward should initially be established by 
application of the initial cost share specified in the formula and 
automatic adjustments to the performance reward should be made as 
the cost share varies in order to maintain the trade-off motivation 
balance originally established. This can be accomplished by multi­
plying the original performance reward by the new composite cost 
share and dividing by the initial cost share to establish the new 
performance reward level.
D. Administration.
Department of Defense procedures for program manage­
ment and control and for administration of contracts were largely 
evolved in an environment of cost-type contracting. In such an 
environment, cost and performance requirements are established as 
goals and the Government and the contractor work hand-in-hand as 
partners toward meeting or exceeding them. In some instances, the 
Government could almost be considered the senior partner since it 
held and exercised the power of the purse. The advent of fixed- 
price type contracts alleviated the need for some of this Government 
control, if not the controls themselves.
Nevertheless, where operational performance and opera­
tional hardware price had not been fixed, as in the development 
phase of a new system, Government control in some areas remained 
vital. Clearly, when a contractor has made realistic contractual
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commitments to price, performance, and delivery of operational 
equipment, the need for Government control of the program is 
further minimized, and cost and performance incentives can be 
structured so as to give every assurance that the contractor will 
be motivated to seize upon opportunities to reduce costs and im­
prove performance, and that where faced with alternatives he will 
choose the course that is most beneficial to the Government.
However, the Department of Defense is not only a 
trustee of public funds but is also the guardian of the national 
defense, and thus cannot afford to wait with check-in-hand for the 
timely delivery of operational hardware meeting the contract 
requirements, but must act throughout the acquisition phase to 
provide reasonable assurance that the requirements of national 
defense will be met in a timely manner. A balance must, there­
fore, be struck between overcontrol and a complete hands-off 
attitude. The potential for damage to the national defense 
posture arising from a contractor's failure to fulfill his 
contractual commitments must be weighed against the costs of 
Government control and the potential for increased program costs, 
technical deficiencies and slippages arising from Government 
interference in the program management. Simply stated, where 
there are appropriate contractual terms, the Government should 
avoid detail control, but should retain sufficient visibility of 
the work to permit prompt action if control is in fact required.
V. THE AIR FORCE EXPERIENCE
To date, the TPPC has been applied up to contract award 
on only one system: the Air Force's C-5A, a heavy logistics air
transport system capable of carrying outsized cargo over long 
ranges at speeds comparable to present commercial jet transports. 
Other programs have been identified for Total Package procurement 
in all of the Services and are in various preliminary stages.
Although the C-5A is the first Total Package procurement, 
the Total Package Concept is not the only first for the C-5A 
acquisition program. The C-5A is also the first system to undergo 
a comprehensive contract definition pursuant to DOD Directive 
3200.9 and the first system in which the complete Air Force Systems 
Command 375 series of program management documents have been 
applied from the outset.
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An RFP, containing, among other things, a Work Statement 
and Model Contract for CD, and a Work Statement and Model Contract 
for development and acquisition of the C-5A system, was distributed 
on December 11, 1964, to the three airframe and two engine contrac­
tors who had participated in the parametric studies leading up to 
the approval of the C-5A program. On December 31, 1964, the Air 
Force entered into a CD contract with each of the five contractors, 
the Work Statement of which called for the identification of, and 
preparation of performance specifications for, each end item re­
quired for an operational system, as well as a price proposal for 
development, production, and support of such hardware. Support 
would include all required aeronautical ground equipment, training 
equipment and contractor technical services, together with spares 
and maintenance through the Category II Test Period. Spares beyond 
Category II would be added to the contract by provisioning action 
and would be priced in accordance with a detailed pricing exhibit 
or a pricing formula stated in the contract.
Award of a contract would be made to the source whose cost 
and technical proposals as evaluated by the Air Force demonstrated 
the greatest overall cost effectiveness over a 10-year operating 
period of a system complying with all of the minimum performance 
requirements established in the RFP. To this end, the contractor 
was required to prepare a 10-year operating cost estimate on certain 
given assumptions. This was to be added to the RDT&E and production 
costs and compared with the productivity of the proposed system over 
the same period. Although the initial production airframe buy was 
only 57 systems, a priced option was obtained on 58 more, and costs 
and productivity for source selection purposes was to be computed on 
a buy of 115 total operational systems.
The technical proposals were submitted on April 20, 1965 
and the cost proposals on April 27, 1965. Definitive FPI contracts 
for RDT&E, delivery of 57 total systems, and support as outlined 
above, were negotiated and signed by each of the contractors prior 
to the Source Selection announcement on September 30, 1965.
The contract delivery schedule for total systems was based 
on the airframe contractors "most economic production" estimate 
designed to meet a December 1969 date for an operational capability 
of one squadron. The engine contract delivery schedule was in turn 
constructed to meet the total system schedule in the most economical 
manner. In both contracts, the development test plan, including 
timing and hardware to be used in test, was based upon the contrac­
tor's proposal for the most economic plan meeting the Air Force's
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test data requirements. Both contracts contained alternate prices 
for delivery schedule changes and a specification change pricing 
clause designed to inhibit the initiation of specification changes.
Priced options in each contract will enable the Government 
to order up to 58 additional total systems, and formula options can 
be exercised to order up to 85 additional systems beyond the priced 
quantity of 115. Each contract provides for a target profit equal 
to 107, of the target cost and a ceiling price equal to 130% of 
target cost. Priced options will be added to targets and ceiling 
as they are exercised, as will provisioned spares, and the final 
incentive fee computation will be made on the basis of the 115 
total systems and support. The formula option for an additional 85 
total systems will be exercised in a separate fixed-price incentive 
contract with a 10% target profit and a 120% ceiling price.
Both the engine and airframe contracts contain an escala­
tion clause to protect against abnormal fluctuations in the economy. 
Both contracts contain a clause providing for adjustments to targets 
and ceilings in the event of changes in the Federal Laws affecting 
labor-associated costs, and a clause providing for limited (but not 
"get well") adjustments in the option prices if actual production 
costs on the first 57 systems deviate substantially from the ori­
ginally targeted production costs.
Both contractors proposed on the basis of three alternate 
cost-incentive formulas, 85/15 over target and 50/50 under, 70/30 
over target and 50/50 under, and the flexible incentive with an 
initial share of 85/15 over and under target. The target prices 
proposed indicated a preference for the flexible incentive. Never­
theless, since the airframe contractor was willing to accept a 
70/30 overrun share, and the consequently greater risk involved, 
at a relatively small increase in target price, the Air Force chose 
the 70/30 - 50/50 formula for the airframe contract, while in­
serting the flexible incentive in the engine contract. Neither 
contract provides for the construction or provision of additional 
Government facilities beyond those presently used by the contractors
Performance incentives in both contracts have, to the 
extent feasible, undertaken to arrive at specific overall per­
formance attributes. Rewards for increases in such overall per­
formance characteristics have been computed on the basis of value 
to the Air Force in an operational environment of a three-squadron 
quantity over a 10-year period, with the contractor to receive an
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amount in proportion to his share in cost overruns. The flexible 
incentive clause includes an automatic adjustment of performance 
awards as the cost share changes.
Both contracts provide for 90% progress payments during 
the RDT&E and production effort until such time as payments for 
hardware deliveries have reduced the contractor's unrecovered costs 
to a stated amount, at which time future progress payments will be 
made at 70% of total costs.
Correction of Deficiencies clauses in both contracts extend 
the time period in which actionable deficiencies in the total sys­
tems may be discovered, in order to include an adequate opportunity 
for utilization of each item of hardware in an operational environ­
ment. Costs involved in correcting such deficiencies are allowable 
costs under the terms of the incentive contract, but no adjustments 
are made in target price or ceiling price.
In recognition of the potential for disputes between the 
airframe and engine contractors as to responsibility for correction 
of deficiencies in the total system arising in an operational en­
vironment, and the resultant difficulty in assessing responsibility 
as between the two prime contractors, the airframe contract provides 
that given the airframe contractor's concurrence in the original 
engine specifications, any changes thereto, and the demonstrated 
compliance with those specifications, the airframe contractor will, 
as to the Government, assume responsibility for correction of any 
deficiencies in the total system. The Air Force has agreed to allo­
cate costs of correcting such deficiencies between the contracts as 
determined by the airframe and engine contractors pursuant to an 
agreement to which the Government is not a party.
Although each contract calls for an RDT&E and production 
effort covering several years, a limitation on the Government's 
total liability in each year has been included which establishes a 
ceiling in the event of termination for convenience in that year.
Despite the magnitude of the initial efforts required by 
both the Government and the myriad number of contractors and sub­
contractors involved in the C-5A competition, application of the 
TPPC to the C-5A procurement is believed, on balance, to be an un­
qualified success. The largest plus factor apparent at this time 
was the Air Force's ability to engender performance and price compe­
tition on an initial acquisition program of about 2 billion dollars,
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which will approximate 3 billion dollars if the competitively 
priced options are exercised.
Acceptance of the historical premise that only a small 
portion of this program would otherwise have been acquired in a 
truly price competitive environment, and application of the 
Department's historically generated price competition cost- 
reduction factor of 25%, gives a quick and dirty answer to any 
would-be critics of the Concept. To this must be added the inherent 
cost economies allowed for by a multi-year buy.
No historical factor has been established for potential 
cost reduction arising from the contractor's motivation to design 
for economical production and reliability and simplicity of 
maintenance,10/ nor from his motivation to obtain supplies and 
services from the most efficient sources, whether in-house or by 
outside contract, but the effects on total cost to the Government 
cannot be disregarded.
Similarly, the tightening of design and configuration 
discipline on both the Government and the contractors, both prior 
to and during the program, must have a beneficial effect by re­
ducing the need for changes during the program. Other opportuni­
ties for economy, inherent in a concept which places maximum 
responsibility on the contractor for not only economic production, 
but economic operation as well, arise from the cost and performance 
incentives of the contract and will be garnered in years to come as 
reflected in the final acquisition and operating cost of the system.
Paled by the magnitude of the benefits derived, but never­
theless of substantial import when viewed individually, is the vast 
amount of national resources expended by both the Government and 
industry prior to contract award. Total competing contractor and 
subcontractor costs have been estimated to have exceeded 100 
million dollars. Government resources expended, in addition to 
those involved in preparation of the 1500 page initial RFP and the 
approximately like number of pages of the clarifications issued 
during contract definition, include the 132,000 man-hours spent by 
source selection evaluating teams as well as time spent by higher 
echelons in coordinating and reviewing the teams' efforts to 
analyze and evaluate some 240,000 pages of data.
To summarize its benefits, it is believed that Total 
Package procurement will evoke competitive proposals involving 
neither "buy-in" bidding nor overcontingencies with respect to
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performance or cost, that the contracts resulting therefrom will 
provide a framework in which respectable profits can be earned if 
the contractors meet their commitments and are in fact efficient, 
and that the Government will pay the lowest reasonable price for 
products of the desired quality.
VI. THE FUTURE OF THE TOTAL PACKAGE CONCEPT
The already demonstrated benefits of application of the 
TPPC to the C-5A program, without more, have been enough to engender 
considerable interest in the Concept and its potential applications. 
Identification of potential and preparation for Total Package con­
tracting in the Air Force SRAM,11/ the Navy FDL,12/ and other pro­
grams attests to this fact. The Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering has asked the Air Force for a comprehensive analysis of 
its C-5A procurement experience to be distributed through his office 
to all Secretarial level OSD and Service offices dealing with In­
stallations and Logistics and Research and Development. The Assis­
tant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) has asked 
the Air Force to prepare a statement of broad policy guidelines for 
the application of the Concept for Department of Defense-wide im­
plementation through the Armed Services Procurement Regulation 
Committee.
How wide an application the Concept will have within the 
Department of Defense is a function of many variables, some of which 
pertain to the basic requirements of our defense posture and its 
relationship to conditions in a constantly changing world. The 
Concept must be limited to cases where the technical factors and 
risks, and the product, can be defined within reasonable limits.
But these limits are broader than one might suppose, for several 
reasons. Increasingly over the past several years, DOD has embarked 
on advanced development programs intended to establish experimen­
tally the feasibility of subsystems and components before full 
development is initiated. This is the building block approach.
Thus, for example, in the C-5A, significant technical ad­
vances in the engine were needed to decrease fuel consumption and 
increase thrust, well beyond the then state-of-the-art. But several 
years prior to the initiation of the C-5A development, the Air Force 
funded a series of developments of engine components, and the testing 
of so-called demonstrator engines which incorporated certain critical 
structural, mechanical and aerodynamic features. Thus, the technical 
difficulties, even on a frontier-probing development, were identifi­
able and assessable before contractor commitments were made. Further,
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the wide variety of cost incentive patterns, including the 
flexible incentive, permits the contractual arrangement to be 
tailored to the risk.
Consequently, if Contract Definition and the building 
block approach are pursued, most development-production programs 
will be candidates for Total Package procurement.
Other variables in determining the application of the 
Concept depend primarily on the selection techniques used to 
identify those systems that should be acquired.13/
Within the above constraints, the extent to which the 
Concept might be applied is a function of the benefits to be 
achieved as weighed against the disadvantages to be endured on the 
basis of a case-by-case analysis of the procurement involved. In 
view of its success to date in the C-5A program, maximum efforts 
are being made to eliminate, insofar as is possible, the problems 
experienced in that application.
As discussed above, one area of concern is the massive 
Government and industry efforts expended prior to and during the 
C-5A Source Selection period. While these efforts represented a 
marked increase over those expended prior to contract award in 
other programs, it should not be assumed that all, or even a sub­
stantial part, of such effort was unnecessary or of marginal 
utility. Inasmuch as the C-5A procurement was a vehicle for the 
initial application of full-scale contract definition and the 
AFSC - 375 management series as well as the TPPC, it is difficult 
to ascertain what, if any, significant extra effort was required 
by the Total Package approach.
Clearly, both contract definition and the 375 series are 
designed to require more thought and analysis by both Government 
and industry prior to contract award. The fact that more than one 
contractor is undertaking this effort, thereby automatically in­
creasing the total industry effort and consequently the Government's 
evaluation efforts, is recognized as desirable by the Contract 
Definition Directive. The logical premise for this approach is the 
anticipation that greater efforts in a competitive environment prior 
to contract award will be more than offset by reduction of post­
award effort and consequently result in lower program costs and 
higher technical performance. Extension of this approach to a Total 
Package procurement indicates that any additional effort required in
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obtaining price and performance commitments will be offset by 
elimination of the post-development effort involved in negotiating 
definitive production, support and spares contracts on an annual 
basis, especially in a sole source environment.
In spite of these valid reasons for increased efforts 
prior to contract award, the Air Force’s C-5A experience indicates 
that considerable room for improvement does exist. Government and 
industry effort in the precontract award period is designed to re­
sult in a verification that the system should, in fact, be developed 
and produced, selection of a source, and the execution of a defini­
tive contract. Therefore, any effort expended must be evaluated in 
the light of its materiality to one or more of these goals. Orderly 
time-phasing of these efforts in terms of contractor generation and 
Government evaluation of data provides an opportunity for economy of 
manpower utilization not unrelated to a production learning curve.
Clearly, the stated goals of CD can be accomplished se­
quentially, thereby utilizing the educational benefits of prior in­
volvement. Limitation of Government and industry effort prior to 
award to these stated goals is especially important in a competitive 
situation where the efforts of one or more of the losers, and the 
related Government effort expended in other areas, may be largely 
for naught. Thus, in addition to the sequential efforts approach, 
which should be undertaken in any contract definition, the key maxim 
of any competitive contract definition must be "Put off until to­
morrow (post-selection) anything you don’t have to do today (pre­
selection)."
The Total Package approach itself offers two potential 
areas for reduction in pre-award effort. A substantial portion of 
the C-5A pre-award effort was in the preparation and evaluation of 
data required by the Government in order to provide a base for con­
tinuing data requirements designed to provide the Government with 
sufficient information upon which to exercise its management respon­
sibilities. The Total Package Concept, by obtaining price and per­
formance commitments at the outset of a program and providing in­
centives structured to motivate the contractor to make decisions to 
his and the Government’s best interests, places a much greater 
responsibility on the contractor, and the Government's responsi­
bility should decrease accordingly. This shift in responsibility 
should obviate the need for much of the continuing information re­
quirement during the program and consequently the requirement for 
a data base during CD.
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Moreover, where a contractor undertakes price and per­
formance commitments in a truly competitive environment, the extent 
of the Government's evaluation efforts during source selection 
should be substantially decreased. The competitive atmosphere 
guards against conservatism, while the contractual commitment guards 
against "puffing." Thus, detail analysis of cost and pricing data 
may not be required prior to contract award. Likewise, detail 
technical evaluation of proposed designs to determine the validity 
of performance commitments may be capable of being reduced in the 
pre-award period.
This is not to say that detail cost and design data should 
not be required after award, if necessary, nor that application of 
a selective audit technique to both cost and technical proposals 
during source selection is undesirable. It is only intended that 
recognition be given to the fact that an earlier selection14/ has 
designated the competitors as being the most capable of developing 
and producing the system, and that each of the competitors, spurred 
on by the competition and constrained by the spectre of financial 
loss, is not likely to propose much more or less than he is con­
vinced he can achieve.
In addition to an analysis of the magnitude of the precon­
tract effort, an evaluation is also being made to assure that appli­
cation of the Concept in Operational Systems Development does not 
inhibit creativity on the part of the contractor. The contrary may 
well be the case. The Concept provides great latitude for, and 
directly encourages, creativity as explained below.
1. Competition spurs all of us on to greater efforts.
a. In a cost effectiveness-type competition, the 
contractor is encouraged to optimize performance in terms of a 
productivity/cost relationship.
b. The source selection activity's attention is 
directed to total cost (investment, operation and maintenance) vs. 
mission performance relationships, rather than development cost vs. 
technological considerations; thereby allowing the contractor 
greater latitude to propose high cost development work which will 
substantially decrease production, maintenance or operating costs.
2. Identification of end items and establishment of end 
item performance specifications during CD is not peculiar to Total
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Package acquisition, but rather, is a prerequisite to Engineering 
or Operational Systems Development as well.
3. While the Total Package approach and the consequent 
emphasis on accuracy of development and production cost estimates 
may require the contractor to engage in some design effort during 
CD, this by no means locks him in to the design upon which his 
Total Package proposal is based. If anything, these designs serve 
only as a baseline from which the contractor is motivated by the 
inclusion of cost and performance incentives in the Total Package 
contract to apply his ingenuity and creativity during the develop­
ment stage. A flexible cost incentive with a related "total cost" 
(R&D, Production, Facilities, Maintenance, and Operation) over 
"productivity" incentive provides a contractor with maximum lati­
tude for application of creative effort, and more important, rewards 
him handsomely when such efforts are successful.
In a situation where the benefits to be gained must be 
weighed against the efforts to be expended, reduction in precontract 
effort will automatically expand the field of potential application 
of the Concept. Nevertheless, new applications must consider the 
magnitude of the new benefits to be derived. The C-5A experience 
involved a competitive CD for a system designated for Operational 
Systems Development -- that is, full-scale engineering development 
and substantial production. This is clearly the most fertile 
situation for obtaining maximum incremental benefit from application 
of the Concept. When competition for some reason is not possible, 
the effort required for Total Package contracting must be weighed 
against the remaining advantages15/.
Elimination of substantial production as in a straight 
Engineering Development Program involving only hardware for test 
and evaluation, reduces the area of benefit, but likewise reduces 
the precontract effort involved. In fact, the Department of Defense 
has been procuring such work as Total Package acquisitions for many 
years. Reciprocally, elimination of a substantial RDT&E effort, as 
in advertised procurements of off-the-shelf and commercially 
available items, likewise reduces the area of benefit and the pre­
contract effort required. Whether such programs should be con­
sidered for Total Package procurement with regard to production 
and support equipment, including operation and training equipment, 
together with support services, should be an individual decision 
made by balancing the reduced benefits against the reduced precon­
tract effort.
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The immediate impetus for additional Total Package appli­
cations would seem to be in the area of competitive Operational 
System Development. The determinative factor in application to any 
such program should be the degree of stability of the engineering 
and production aspects of the program and the level of confidence 
that the program will not for any other reason change appreciably 
prior to introducing the system or equipment into the defense inven­
tory. The sub-factors which influence this determination are (1) 
degree of technical risk, (2) certainty of system characteristics 
and requirements, (3) interface with an unstable system, (4) sta­
bility of force structure and production quantities required, and 
(5) feasibility and practicability of competing the program. It 
should be recognized that all of the above sub-factors are in­
fluenced by the degree of planning and effort expended prior to 
and during CD.
The greater the degree of planning applied prior to con­
tract award, the greater the potential for application of the TPPC. 
Thus, no automatic barometer for application should be derived. Ad­
vance planning and good judgment will always be required to set the 
stage for successful applications. Moreover, the Concept itself has 
not been defined in detail and does not establish rigorous require­
ments in its application. Refinements will continue to be made and 
adjustments to a particular situation should be encouraged.
In short, the future of Total Package contracting depends 
solely on the continuation of the preponderance of benefits to be 
derived over the effort required -- which in turn depends on the 
ingenuity and imagination demonstrated by both Government and 
industry in suiting the concept to future programs.
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FOOTNOTES
1/ Referred to hereafter as "the Department" or "DOD."
2/ See Fortune, November 1965; Space Age News, October 
1965; Time Magazine, October 8, 1965.
3/ Referred to hereafter as "the Concept" or "TPPC."
4/ "Operational System Developments - Include research and
development effort directed toward development, engineering 
and test of systems, support programs, vehicles and weapons 
that have been approved for production and Service employ­
ment. This area is included for convenience in considering 
all RDT&E projects. All items in this area are major line 
item projects which appear as RDT&E Costs of Weapon System 
Elements in other programs. Program control will thus be 
exercised by review of the individual research and develop­
ment effort in each Weapon System Element." DOD Directive 
3200.6 (Incl 3) dated June 7, 1962.
5/ CPFF defined and explained at ASPR 3-405.5.
FFP defined and explained at ASPR 3-404.2.
FPI defined and explained at ASPR 3-404.4.
6/ Negotiation of price on a production contract begins with 
cost negotiation and then proceeds to fee negotiation to 
result in a negotiated price or target price. Fee negotia­
tion is in the form of a percentage to be applied to the 
cost established in the cost negotiation. The percentage, 
under the weighted guideline approach set forth in ASPR 
3-808, reflects the resources to be applied and the risks 
to be undertaken by the contractor. While percentages 
vary from contract to contract, the greatest potential for 
fee maximization remains in the negotiation of a high 
estimated or target cost, and this in turn evolves from an 
analysis of the cost of the development hardware. Unfor­
tunately, development of a high cost item leads to greater 
profit on production and follow-on support contracts.
7/ DOD Directive 3200.9, dated July 1, 1965.
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8/ The extent of a competition relates to the quantitative 
area in which the competitors will be judged. If you ask 
men to ride a mile on horseback, but tell them that the 
winner will be selected on the basis of the first 1/4 
mile, it can hardly be assumed that competition will exist 
over the last 3/4 miles. Similarly, the form of a competi­
tion relates to the qualitative criteria upon which competi­
tors will be judged. In the case of the horsemen, this is 
demonstrated by the differences between a competition in 
which points are awarded for form and one in which points 
are awarded on the basis of position at the finish line. 
Finally, the intensity of a competition relates to the 
quality and motivation of the competition, which is usually 
a function of the wealth and/or prestige attached to the 
prize.
9/ This clause is discussed in the text dealing with main­
taining price commitments (page 11).
10/ A rough estimate of potential savings can be drawn by analogy 
from Value Engineering (VE) savings potential. The Depart­
ment considers 10% of contract price as a modest approximation 
of potential VE savings on production and operational costs. 
Application of this factor to the production portion of a 
Total Package contract would be conservative, inasmuch as 
many opportunities for production and operating cost savings 
are lost in the initial design phase and can never be regained 
by VE.
11/ SRAM is the acronym for a Short Range Attack Missile for use 
in an air-to-ground environment.
12/ FDL is the acronym for a Fast Deployment Logistic Ship with 
rapid cargo handling capabilities and embarked lighterage 
and helicopters for over-the-beach unloading in the absence 
of port facilities.
13/ Responsibility for policy generation in these areas lies 
with the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis).
Policy so promulgated will, as in the case of the potential 
for application of TPPC in the C-5A, SRAM, FDL and other 
programs, have a direct effect on procurement techniques.
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14/ DOD Directive 3200.9 requires a source selection in 
accordance with DOD Directive 4105.62, April 6, 1965, 
to choose the contractor or contractors to undertake 
a contract definition program.
15/ See anticipated benefits of TPPC in text (page 3).
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